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TINKER OPERATIONALIZED: THE JUDICIARY'S
PRACTICAL ANSWER TO STUDENT CYBERSPEECH
INTRODUCTION
As the current generation of American students embraces the In-
ternet- more completely than any before it,1 online student speech
(student cyberspeech) continues to generate controversy in schools
and myriad First Amendment issues in the lower courts.2 In address-
ing school regulation of student speech, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly emphasized the special characteristics of the school
environment and required a balance to be struck between students'
free speech rights and the operation of schools. 3 The Supreme Court
has not, however, provided any specific guidance on how to approach
the growing issue of student cyberspeech.4 Thus, while it is left to
district and circuit courts to strike a functional balance between online
student expression and schools' disciplinary authority in particular
cases, delineating the details of that balance is fraught with difficulty.
To start, the broad formulation of the First Amendment offers no
clarification for courts attempting to devise a standard applicable to
1. In a survey conducted in December 2000, the Pew Research Center found that 73% of
teens used the Internet occasionally and 42% of teens used the Internet daily, while a similar
survey in September 2009 put the numbers at all time highs of 93% and 63%, respectively. See
PEW RESEARCH CTR., PEW RESEARCH CENTERS INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: TEEN
INTERNET USAGE OVER TIME (2009), available at http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Teens)/Us-
age-Over-Time.aspx.
2. One of the first cases to address the problem of student cyberspeech was Beussink v. Wood-
land R-IV School District. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (addressing a website created by a student at home, which featured crude and
vulgar language that was highly critical of the high school administration). Since then, the fact
patterns in student-cyberspeech cases have run the gamut from simply puerile to considerably
disturbing. Compare Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2011)
(addressing a student-created MySpace profile parody of a school principal, which claimed that
the principle smoked "big blunt[s]" and was a "big fag"), with O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach
Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110409, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (addressing
an online video posted by a student that depicted a graphic dramatization of a teacher's murder).
3. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Morse v. Fred-
erick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
4. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of student free speech as recently as 2007 in Morse
v. Frederick, but this case did not involve cyberspeech and the Court narrowly held that schools
may "restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use." See
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
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the particularized issue of student cyberspeech. 5 In its turn, the Su-
preme Court recognized a general right to free speech for students in
schools less than fifty years ago,6 but has given limited consideration
to the issue since then.7 Finally, the Supreme Court specifically de-
clined to address cyberspeech in its latest student-speech decision,
Morse v. Frederick.8 Consequently, because the decisions of the Su-
preme Court are, in effect, the only guidance that lower courts have
for regulating student speech, including student cyberspeech, these
courts must rule in student-speech cases solely by reference to a small
body of case law.
Additionally, the guidance of the Supreme Court is constrained
with respect to student cyberspeech because most cyberspeech
originates off campus and thus does not technically occur in school.9
Therefore, the precedent is unclear about when, or if, school officials
may discipline students for cyberspeech created off campus. 10
This uncertainty has prompted concern among commentators that
schools and courts are unconstitutionally limiting the First Amend-
ment rights of students in cyberspeech cases.11 At the center of much
of the recent cyber-age controversy is Doninger v. Niehoff, decided by
the Second Circuit subsequent to Morse.12 In Doninger, the court
held that a principal did not violate a student's First Amendment
rights when she punished the student for posting a blog from an off-
campus location.' 3 The bases for concern are varied. One commenta-
tor expressed concern that such Second Circuit cases are irreconcila-
ble with a recent Third Circuit decision, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ....").
6. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
7. See generally infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
9. In the majority of student-cyberspeech cases, the cyberspeech at issue was created on a
personal computer at the student's house. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (addressing an online profile created at home); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (addressing an online blog written at home).
10. See Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers &
Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRsT
AMEND. L. REV. 210, 213 (2009).
11. See id. at 210-12; see also Nathan S. Fronk, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff: An Example of
Public Schools' Paternalism and the Off-Campus Restriction of Students' First Amendment
Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 1440 (2010); Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to
Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student
Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON L. REV. 247, 288-89 (2010).
12. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 41.
13. Id. at 53.
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District,14 in which the court concluded that a school impermissibly
infringed upon the First Amendment rights of a student under similar
circumstances.1 5 Other commentators have expressed concern that
decisions such as Doninger give too much deference to school offi-
cials.16 Yet another has stressed the importance of "the foundational
query of when school officials may properly assert in-school discipli-
nary authority over high-tech, off-campus-created expression, ' 17 and
urged the Supreme Court to render a decision on the boundaries of
school jurisdiction over student cyberspeech. 18
In this social and judicial landscape, then, the importance of articu-
lating an approach to student cyberspeech cannot be overstated. 19 In
the absence of direct guidance from the Supreme Court, the practical
question is what, if any, meaningful standard has been utilized by the
judiciary to address the growing phenomenon of student cyberspeech.
This Comment proposes an empirical answer to that question. More
specifically, it argues that a discerning analysis of the growing body of
student-cyberspeech jurisprudence in the lower courts reveals a pre-
vailing approach, which this Comment calls the "operationalized
Tinker standard. ' 20 At first blush, it might be tempting to claim that
no coherence exists in the regulation of student cyberspeech, and that
the Supreme Court should decide such a case to provide clarity on the
issue. 21 Yet the operationalized Tinker standard proposed by this
Comment preserves student rights in accord with the Supreme Court's
prevailing student-speech decisions, thus obviating the need for Su-
preme Court intervention.
14. Cf. Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Stu-
dent Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 100 (2010) ("[R]ecent
cases in the Second and Third Circuits demonstrate uncertainty as to whether Fraser applies to
online, off-campus speech.").
15. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). In this
case, a school punished a student for the off-campus creation of a fake online profile of her
principal. Id. at 920.
16. Fronk, supra note 11, at 1441-42.
17. Calvert, supra note 10, at 213 ("Without such threshold jurisdictional authority over the
off-campus-created expression, one never reaches the second issue about which substantive rules
from Supreme Court cases . . . should be applied to a given case.").
18. Id. at 251.
19. See, e.g., id. at 214, 216 ("[T]he [cyberspeech] quandary ... has picked up substantial
steam at the federal court level since the High Court handed down Morse .... ").
20. See infra Part III. This Comment articulates the operationalized Tinker standard as a
practicable standard for the regulation of student cyberspeech, namely that a student may express
her opinion so long as doing so does not materially and substantially intrude upon the work of the
school.
21. See Calvert, supra note 10, at 250-51.
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Part II of this Comment explores the background of Supreme Court
student-free-speech jurisprudence. 22 Part III first addresses the limits
of Supreme Court precedent with regard to student cyberspeech and
then analyzes how lower courts have proceeded in student-cyber-
speech cases in light of these limits. 23 Part III proceeds to argue that
most lower courts have employed the limited Supreme Court prece-
dent logically and consistently by operationalizing the Tinker decision;
that is, courts have routinely applied the analysis espoused in Tinker
to all manner of student-speech cases to create a practicable student-
cyberspeech standard. 24 Operationalizing the Tinker standard recon-
ciles apparently disparate decisions such as Doninger and Blue Moun-
tain School District; in fact, these decisions provide clear examples of
this standard in practice. 25 Part IV outlines the impact of the opera-
tionalized Tinker standard and analyzes its utility for both students
and school administrators.2 6 In Part V, this Comment concludes that
the overarching consistency of student-cyberspeech jurisprudence in
the lower courts has rendered Supreme Court intervention
unnecessary. 27
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment and Student Speech
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
which all rights to free expression are derived, provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. ' '28 The
right to free speech is understood to be a fundamental right in the
United States and receives strong constitutional protection; in general,
content-based restriction of speech is subject to strict scrutiny review,
while content-neutral restriction is subject to intermediate scrutiny re-
view.2 9 However, the language of the First Amendment is extremely
22. See infra notes 28-78 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 79-109 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 110-93 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 194-240 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 241-53 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
29. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20-37 (3d ed. 2010). A restriction of
speech is content-based if it is enforced based on the substance of what is being said, and con-
tent-neutral if it broadly bans speech without regard for the specifics of what is being said. For
example, if a speaker is restricted in the delivery of a particular message, but would not have
been restricted in the delivery of a different message under exactly the same circumstances, the
restriction is likely content-based. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) ("A
group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said
"God Bless America" and "God Loves You" [as opposed to "Thank God for Dead Soldiers"],
[Vol. 62:125
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broad; if interpreted literally, it would grant absolute and unrestricted
freedom of speech. Aware of this fact, the Supreme Court has justi-
fied the restriction of certain categories of speech by recognizing that
the inherent harm in these categories outweighs their social value.
30
Such unprotected speech includes "true threats,"31 "fighting words,"
32
obscene speech,33 and defamatory speech.34 As such, the right to free
speech is not absolute and state actors, including schools, can prevent
and punish some limited categories of speech.
Moreover, with regard to schools specifically, the Supreme Court
has taken note of the "special characteristics of the school environ-
ment" 35 and allowed schools to punish and limit student speech more
extensively in light of that environment. 36 The following quartet of
cases delineates the Supreme Court's current understanding of
schools' "special characteristics" and governs the issue of student free
speech.
B. Tinker: The Foundation of Student Free Speech Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for student free speech in
1969 when it famously stated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 37 In Tinker, students wore
black armbands to school in silent protest of American involvement in
would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort
damages." (emphasis added)). In practice, however, the content distinction is not always clear.
See FARBER, supra, at 20-37.
30. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.").
31. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969).
32. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74 (holding that speech directed at another that is
likely to provoke violence is unprotected).
33. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled
by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (finding that although
there is a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited," even a public official can recover damages for a defamatory statement made "with
the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
35. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court recog-
nized tension in the fact that schools have "comprehensive authority ... to prescribe and control
conduct" while "educating the young for citizenship," and noted that the problem arises when
"students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authori-
ties." Id. at 507.
36. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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the Vietnam War.38 Concerned that the gesture would cause contro-
versy,39 school administrators suspended the students until they re-
moved the armbands.40
The majority in Tinker recognized that the special characteristics of
the school's educational environment required delicate balancing. 41
On the one hand, such an environment was "reason for scrupulous
protection of constitutional freedoms of the [student], if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source."' 42 The Court weighed this inter-
est against "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
States and of school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools. ' 43 The Supreme Court held that the students' suspension
was a violation of their First Amendment rights,44 and reasoned that a
student may express his opinions in school so long as doing so does
not "materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" or collide with
the rights of others. 45
However, the Court also unequivocally stated that a school may be
able to justify the restriction of student speech if it can "show that its
[disciplinary] action was caused by something more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort ... that always accompan[ies] an unpopular
viewpoint. ' 46 Thus, the Court left open the possibility that student
speech could be regulated on facts that might reasonably lead school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption, 47 but specified that the
forecast of disruption must be based on more than "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance. ' 48 Although the language of the
opinion applied the "substantial disruption" test to in-school student
speech, the Court implied that its decision could extend beyond the
school campus.49
38. Id. at 504.
39. Id. at 510.
40. See id. at 504.
41. See id. at 507.
42. Id.
43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
44. Id. at 514.
45. Id. at 513.
46. Id. at 509.
47. See id. at 514.
48. Id. at 508.
49. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 ("[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.").
[Vol. 62:125
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C. Fraser: An Exception for Lewd or Vulgar Speech
The other three Supreme Court cases that addressed student free
speech can usefully be interpreted as limitations on, or exceptions to,
the broad "substantial disruption" test set out in Tinker.50 The first of
these, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, was decided in 1986.51
In Fraser, a high school student made a nomination speech that con-
tained a sexually suggestive metaphor in front of an auditorium of 600
classmates. 52 The next morning, the assistant principal notified the
student that he had been removed from the list of possible commence-
ment speakers and suspended for three days.53
Again, the Court recognized the need to strike a balance,5 4 yet "re-
affirmed that the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings."'55 The Court did not use the Tinker "substantial disruption"
standard, but instead reasoned that public schools have a duty to
"teach[ ] students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 56
The Court held that the school's punishment did not violate the stu-
dent's First Amendment rights because schools have the authority to
prevent the undermining of the school's basic educational mission by
prohibiting lewd and vulgar speech.5 7 Notably, as in Tinker, the Court
emphasized the in-school nature of the speech.58
50. See Tova Wolking, School Administrators as Cyber Censors: Cyber Speech and First
Amendment Rights, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1507, 1510-11 (2008) ("In Fraser... [t]he Court
marked a new exception to Tinker .. "); James M. Patrick, Comment, The Civility-Police: The
Rising Need to Balance Students' Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School's
Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 860 (2010) ("In its decision in Bethel, the Supreme
Court created an exception to the applicability of Tinker .... ").
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
52. Id. at 677-78. The following are excerpts from the student's speech: "I know a man who is
firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his
belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm"; "Jeff Kuhlman ... doesn't attack things in spurts-
he drives hard, pushing and pushing .. "; "Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the
climax, for each and every one of you." Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 678 (majority opinion).
54. See id. at 681 ("The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.").
55. Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)).
56. See id. at 681.
57. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
58. See id. ("A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit mono-
logue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it was per-
fectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself .... ").
2012]
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D. Kuhlmeier: An Exception for Speech Bearing the Imprimatur of
the School
The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of student free speech
just two years later in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.59 In
Kuhlmeier, a school withheld two student-written articles from publi-
cation in the school newspaper because the principal disapproved of
their content. 60 The Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether the school newspaper constituted a public forum.61 After
concluding that the school newspaper was not a public forum,62 the
Court held that school officials were entitled to regulate the contents
of the school newspaper. 63
The Court distinguished Tinker64 and held that when the speech
"might [be] reasonably perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the
school," educators may exercise control over that speech "so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. '65 Like the majority in Fraser, the Kuhlmeier Court sought to
protect the school's ability to dissociate itself from certain manners
and styles of student speech.66 The holding of Kuhlmeier is even nar-
rower still than the holding of Fraser-Kuhlmeier explicitly applies
59. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
60. Id. at 263-64. One of the stories described three Hazelwood East students' experiences
with pregnancy, and the school worried that the anonymity of the subject students was not ade-
quately protected. Id. at 263. The other story at issue discussed the impact of divorce on stu-
dents at school and contained negative statements given by a student about her parents; the
school worried that the parents did not have an opportunity to respond to the remarks. Id.
61. Id. at 267-70. Some of the most common examples of public forums include streets, parks,
and sidewalks. Id. at 267; see also FARBER, supra note 29, at 168. These locations are called
"public forums" because the government "cannot close these facilities to speech activities, can-
not discriminate between speakers based on content, and can exercise little discretion in deter-
mining whether to allow a particular expressive activity." FARBER, supra note 29, at 168. School
facilities, however, are only considered public forums in limited circumstances. See Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. at 267 ("[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities
have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general
public' or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations." (citations omitted)).
62. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270 (reasoning that the school showed no intent to open the pages
of the school newspaper to "indiscriminate use," but "instead reserved the forum for its intended
purpose, as a supervised learning experience for journalism students").
63. Id.
64. See id. at 270-71 (noting that while Tinker addressed the question of "whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech," Kuhlmeier addressed the
question of "whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular
student speech").
65. Id. at 271, 273.
66. Id. at 272 ("A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech
that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use [or] irresponsible sex ....").
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only to school-sponsored speech while Fraser concerned in-school
speech.67
E. Morse: An Exception for Speech Reasonably Thought to
Promote Illegal Drug Use
The most recent chapter of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
issue of student free speech is Morse v. Frederick.68 The student in
Morse unfurled a fourteen-foot banner at a school-sponsored outing
across the street from his school that read, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."
69
The principal "immediately . . . demanded that the banner be taken
down." 70 The student refused to comply with her request and subse-
quently received a ten-day suspension.
71
The principal later explained that she thought the banner would be
interpreted as promoting illegal drug use, and the Court agreed that
the principal's concern was legitimate. 72 The Court reasoned that
"[s]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event . . .
poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect
those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse. ' 73 Thus,
the Court held that "[t]he 'special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment,' and the governmental interest in stopping student drug
abuse... allow schools to restrict student expression that they reason-
ably regard as promoting illegal drug use."
74
67. See id. at 273.
68. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). As stated previously, the Supreme Court chose
not to issue any meaningful dicta with regard to student cyberspeech, only cursorily stating that
"[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school
speech precedents." Id. at 401. It is also interesting to note the divisiveness of the Morse opin-
ion: in addition to the majority, four members of the Court wrote opinions. Id. at 410 (Thomas,
J., concurring); id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 397 (majority opinion). In effect, the student was "in school"-the event was a brief
reprieve from class, during school hours, to watch the Olympic Torch Relay pass. See id.
("[P]rincipal [Morse] decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay as an
approved social event or class trip. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay
from either side of the street." (citation omitted)).
70. Id. at 398.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 401. The principal explained that "when she saw the sign, she thought that the
reference to a 'bong hit' would be widely understood by high school students and others as
referring to smoking marijuana." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In its interpretation,
the Court reasoned that the words of the banner could be taken as an imperative, i.e. "[Take]
bong hits" or, alternatively, as a celebration of drug use; either interpretation, however, sup-
ported the principal's reaction to the banner. Id. at 402.
73. Id. at 408. "The First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events
student expression that contributes to those dangers." Id. at 410.
74. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
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While this holding continued the Supreme Court's trend of "adding
to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker standard, '75 the Court
also sought to clarify Fraser.76 The Court noted that "[t]he mode of
analysis employed in Fraser [was] not entirely clear," but distilled two
principles from that case: (1) "the constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings" and (2) "the mode of analysis set forth in
Tinker is not absolute. ' 77
Based on a comprehensive reading of these cases, the most efficient
and reasonable approach to student speech is to first examine whether
the speech in question falls into any of the exceptions outlined by Fra-
ser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse;78 if it does, then it can clearly be regulated.
However, when, as is the case with the majority of student speech, an
expression does not neatly fit into one of these categories, courts must
turn to the more general doctrine espoused in Tinker. The purpose of
the analysis, then, is to demonstrate the consistency with which courts
have applied Tinker to student cyberspeech.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part examines the limits and implications of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, as well as the lower courts' off-campus student-speech
jurisprudence in light of these implications, to determine the rele-
vance of the foregoing decisions to student cyberspeech. It then pro-
poses that the reaction of the lower courts to the Supreme Court
precedent has created a practicable standard for the regulation of stu-
dent cyberspeech, referred to throughout this Comment as the "oper-
ationalized Tinker standard," namely that a student may express his
opinion so long as doing so does not materially and substantially in-
trude upon the work of the school. The analysis concludes with a de-
tailed distinction between Doninger and Blue Mountain to illustrate
and solidify the principles of this standard.
A. The Limits and Implications of the Supreme Court Student-
Speech Jurisprudence for Student Cyberspeech
Upon careful evaluation of the Supreme Court student-speech pre-
cedent, two limits for student cyberspeech become immediately clear:
(1) the Court has not ruled on student speech that originates off cam-
75. Id. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 404-05 (majority opinion).
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
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pus and (2) Tinker is the Court's only student-speech decision that can
be reasonably applied to most student-cyberspeech cases.
First, while the Supreme Court's approach to the regulation of stu-
dent speech that occurs in school is clear, the Court has never directly
addressed the regulation of off-campus student speech.79 This appears
to be a major hurdle in considering cyberspeech cases because the
cyberspeech being punished by schools is primarily created off cam-
pus.80 Still, though limited, the Supreme Court's precedent provides
the principal guidance for lower courts in student-speech cases. As a
result, while this precedent does not directly address off-campus stu-
dent speech, lower courts are essentially bound to extrapolate it as
sensibly and consistently as possible.
The second important limitation on the Supreme Court's student-
speech precedent results from the particular methodology of the
Court: it created a general rule in Tinker and subsequently carved out
exceptions from this rule.81 The general rule is that only student
speech that is likely to cause a substantial disruption may be regu-
lated. 82 The exceptions to the general rule are the following: lewd or
obscene speech,8 3 speech bearing the imprimatur of the school,84 and
speech promoting illegal drug use. 85 Most student cyberspeech is un-
likely to fall under any of these narrow exceptions. First, in Fraser,
the Court's determination that the students in the auditorium were a
"captive audience" was critical to its reasoning in upholding the stu-
dent's punishment for lewd speech.86 Yet, an Internet audience is un-
likely to be "captive" in the sense described by the Court.8 7 Further,
while a student could create cyberspeech that bore the imprimatur of
the school and theoretically fall under the Kuhlmeier exception, the
likelihood that such cyberspeech would reasonably be thought to be
school sponsored is low given the outrageous nature of most student
79. See generally supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text.
80. See generally infra Part II.C.
81. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 417 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Court has.., set the [Tinker] standard aside on an ad hoc basis").
82. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
86. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
87. See id. at 684-85. "[The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence] recognize[s] the obvious
concern . . . to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually
explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Id. at 684. "A high school assembly or classroom is no place
for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage stu-
dents." Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
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cyberspeech. 88 Student cyberspeech reasonably thought to promote
illegal drug use might be punishable under Morse, but this decision,
like Fraser and Kuhlmeier, is narrowly applicable. Thus, Tinker is
seemingly the only precedent that can be logically applied to the ma-
jority of student cyberspeech, even if it does not expressly apply to
off-campus speech.
Making note of these limits, it is possible to outline the implications
of the Supreme Court jurisprudence for student cyberspeech. There is
an underlying concern present in all four of the Court's decisions that
structures the analysis of the relationship between schools and their
students, namely, the need to strike a balance between student free
speech and school authority.89 That students have a right to free
speech is not in question,90 but as Morse recently affirmed, "the na-
ture of [that right] is what is appropriate for children in school." 91
Therefore, the Supreme Court's student-speech decisions are necessa-
rily framed by the "special characteristics of the school environ-
ment. '92 In Tinker, the special characteristic was identified as the
need of schools "to prescribe and control conduct. ' 93 In Fraser, it was
the need of schools to "teach by example the shared values of a civi-
lized social order. '94 In Kuhlmeier, it was the need of a school to
regulate its curriculum, even outside of the traditional classroom set-
ting.95 Finally, the Court reasoned in Morse that schools have a "par-
ticular concern to prevent student drug abuse. '96
In each case, the special characteristic identified by the Court was
instrumental to its holding. 97 As such, finding a common thread
among these "special characteristics" should help bring the implica-
tions of these decisions into sharper focus. The key is that each of
these special characteristics can properly be described as part of the
fundamental work of schools; it could hardly be disputed that main-
88. See, e.g., supra note 2 (citing cases in which students used cyberspeech to insult and
threaten school teachers and administrators).
89. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
90. The Supreme Court decisions following Tinker have all expressly affirmed that students
do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680;
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
91. Morse. 551 U.S. at 406 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56
(1995)).
92. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
93. Id. at 507.
94. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
95. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
96. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
97. See supra Part 11.
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taining discipline, 98 imparting certain habits of civility, 99 properly in-
structing students, 100 and looking after the safety of students t1 ' fall
within the purview of schools. Moreover, the Supreme Court has de-
clared that the substantial disruption rule of Tinker is "not the only
basis for restricting student speech. ' 10 2 Reading this assertion in con-
junction with the analysis of the various special characteristics of the
school environment, the more operative inquiry under a Tinker analy-
sis is whether the student speech intrudes upon the work of the
school. 10 3 Accordingly, this Comment distills the Supreme Court pre-
cedent into a general standard by making a slight adjustment to the
Tinker substantial disruption rule-a student may express his opinions
so long as doing so does not materially and substantially intrude upon
the work of the school.10 4 With this newly developed standard-the
"operationalized Tinker standard"-in mind, it is easier to understand
how the Court's student-speech precedent can be applied to student
cyberspeech. 10 5
In sum, three important concepts are drawn from this analysis of
the Supreme Court precedent: (1) in the absence of more direct gui-
dance from the Supreme Court, lower courts are forced to make infer-
ences as to the meaning of the existing student-speech cases regarding
off-campus student speech;10 6 (2) the exceptions carved out from
98. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
99. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 205, 221 (1982) ("We have
recognized the public schools as... the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our
society rests." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
101. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
102. Id. at 406.
103. Cf. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 ("There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interfer-
ence, actual or nascent, with the schools' work .... Accordingly, this case does not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools .... ).
104. Note the difference between this standard and the rule originally asserted by the Court in
Tinker, which found that a student may express even controversial opinions on school campus as
long as "he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' Id. at 512-13 (alteration in original)
(emphasis added).
105. At this point, a few remarks about the coining of the phrase "operationalized Tinker
standard" are in order. By its use of the term "operationalized," this Comment means to suggest
that the reasoning of the original Tinker decision has been (and should be) put to use more
extensively than what may have been contemplated by the Court in 1969. To understand and
further effect this broader operation, this new standard modifies Tinker's original language in an
attempt to bring all four of the Supreme Court student-speech decisions within its scope. In this
way, it is less particularized than the Court's individual student-speech holdings, see supra notes
34-103 and accompanying text, and, also, more readily removed from considerations of the in-
school/out-of-school origin of the speech, see infra notes 140-154 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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Tinker are, for the most part, unsuitable for student cyberspeech; 10 7
and (3) the fundamental concern of the Court in reaching a balance
between student rights and school rights is whether student speech
interferes with the work of the school. 108 This empirical analysis of
the Supreme Court precedent, then, points to the operationalized
Tinker standard as the most appropriate standard for the emerging
genre of student cyberspeech. 10 9
B. Lower Courts' Treatment of Off-Campus, Non-Cyber
Student Speech
Lower courts have been required to address off-campus student
speech since before the advent of the Internet. 110 As such, an under-
standing of the principles applied by circuit courts to off-campus stu-
dent speech in non-Internet cases affords perspective for courts' later
treatment of student cyberspeech.
1. Thomas v. Board of Education 1 '
In Thomas, a group of students created a satirical newspaper emu-
lating National Lampoon, but took great effort to sever the connec-
tion between the newspaper and the school." 2 When the newspaper's
existence was revealed to the school administrators, they imposed
five-day suspensions on the students.' 1 3
The Second Circuit explained that this case arose "in a factual con-
text distinct from that envisioned in Tinker and its progeny" because
"all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was
deliberately designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate.' 14
Moreover, the court found that the school officials had ventured "into
the general community where the freedom accorded expression is at
its zenith.""15 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the punish-
ments imposed in this case could not withstand a First Amendment
107. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
110. Cf supra notes 37-77 and accompanying text.
111. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 1045. The students included on the cover of the newspaper a disclaimer of respon-
sibility for copies found on school property, produced the copies by means of a local business,
and only sold the newspaper at a local store. Id. Looking at the facts in this light, the court
found that the students "diligently labored to ensure ... that no copies [of the newspaper] were
sold on school grounds." Id. at 1050.
113. Id. at 1046.




challenge.116 Nonetheless, the court significantly conceded that it
could "envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial
disruption within the school from some remote locale." 17
2. Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield" 8
Boucher is another case in which an underground student newspa-
per sparked controversy." 9 The student in Boucher published an arti-
cle in an unofficial student publication that purported to contain
instructions for hacking the school's computers, and then distributed it
on campus.120 When school district officials determined who had writ-
ten the article, they initially suspended and eventually expelled the
student for one year. 21 The student filed a complaint alleging in-
fringement of his First Amendment rights "accompanied by a motion
for preliminary injunction against the [school's] enforcement of the
expulsion order"; the district court granted the injunction.1 22 The Sev-
enth Circuit later vacated the injunction, finding that the district court
improperly failed to credit the harm the injunction imposed on the
school board. 123
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit addressed the First Amendment
claims by way of dicta. In so doing, the court left open the possibility
of applying the Tinker standard to the First Amendment claims even
though the newspaper originated off campus. 124 The court further
suggested that the school board would likely prevail on the merits of
the First Amendment claim because evidence of past disruption 125
supported an inference of future disruption.126
116. Id. "We may not permit school administrators to seek approval of the community-at-
large by punishing students for expression that took place off school property." Id. at 1051.
117. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n.17.
118. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. The article described, among other things, how to enter the computer's setup utility,
how to view all students' and teachers' login names, the procedure for accessing .com or .exe
files, and tips for circumventing password protection. Id.
121. Id. at 823.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 826-27, 829 ("While the district court's statement that a year's expulsion is extreme
is understandable, we cannot accept the conclusion that the harm the injunction imposes on the
Board is insignificant.... The utter defeat of the Board's disciplinary efforts when confronted by
a self-proclaimed 'hacker' is clearly a substantial harm.").
124. See Boucher, 134 F.3d at 827 ("The Court has indicated that in the case of student expres-
sion, the relevant test is whether school authorities 'have reason to believe' that the expression
will be disruptive.").
125. See id. (noting that the school had to change all of its passwords and call in computer
experts to conduct four hours of diagnostic checks on the computer system).
126. Id.
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3. LaVine v. Blaine School District127
Like the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit also ruled
on an early case that addressed the issue of non-cyber student speech
originating off campus in LaVine. 128 The student in LaVine, while off
campus, wrote a poem unrelated to schoolwork that contained graphic
and violent sentiments about killing his classmates and himself.129 He
later brought the poem to school and gave it to one of his teachers to
review.' 30 Disturbed by the poem's contents, the teacher showed it to
the counselor and the principal; after an investigation, the student was
expelled. 131
The Ninth Circuit applied Tinker without any regard for the fact
that the poem was drafted outside of school and independent of
school activities.1 32 Because the facts revealed a likelihood of instabil-
ity on the part of the student, 133 several school shootings that had re-
cently occurred on other campuses, 134 and the disturbing content of
the poem itself,135 the circuit court found that it was reasonable for
school officials to predict substantial disruption and possible
violence. 136
Reviewing these three decisions, it would appear that the possibility
of using Tinker to regulate off-campus student speech was recognized
by the lower courts as early as 1979.137 Furthermore, Tinker was ap-
127. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
128. See id. at 983-84.
129. The following is an excerpt from the student's poem:
[N]ow I know, what I must do.
I pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it.
I remember, thinking at least I won't, go alone ...
As I walked, through the, now empty halls, I could feel my hart [sic] pounding.
As I approached, the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door, BANG,
BANG, BANG-BANG.
When it was all over, 28 were, dead ....
Id. at 983.
130. Id. at 984, 986.
131. Id. at 984-86.
132. See id. at 989. The court, following its decision in another case, "discerned three distinct
areas of student speech, each of which is governed by a different Supreme Court precedent: (1)
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser; (2) school-sponsored
speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into neither of these categories is
governed by Tinker." Id. at 988-89.
133. The student had discussed suicidal tendencies with the school psychologist, had been
involved in a domestic dispute at home that caused him to leave his house, had been accused of
stalking his ex-girlfriend, and had at least one act of violence on his school record. LaVine, 257
F.3d at 984, 989-90.
134. Id. at 987.
135. Id. at 983-84, 990.
136. Id. at 990.
137. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979).
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plied by way of dicta to an off-campus-created student newspaper in
1998,138 and explicitly to an off-campus-created poem in 2001.139
Thus, these three circuit court cases demonstrate a shift toward the
operationalized Tinker standard and provide an instructive transition
into the lower courts' student-cyberspeech jurisprudence.
C. Lower Courts' Treatment of Off-Campus Student Cyberspeech
1. Operationalizing Tinker
One of the primary concerns among commentators with the regula-
tion of student cyberspeech is the fact that most cyberspeech is cre-
ated off campus, where freedom of expression is least restrained. 140
The main argument is that, in addressing student-cyberspeech issues,
courts must determine whether the school has jurisdiction over the
speech in the first place because the Supreme Court has never explic-
itly granted schools jurisdiction over off-campus speech. 141 The lower
courts, however, do not seem to share this concern. To start, the cir-
cuit court decisions in Thomas, Boucher, and LaVine illustrate the
willingness of courts to apply the substantive Tinker standard in cases
in which traditional, non-electronic student speech originated off cam-
pus. 14 2 Whether the student speech was brought to or distributed on
campus is an important consideration: when the speech reached
school grounds, the courts were more likely to find that punishment of
the student was proper.1 43 Moreover, because the Tinker standard has
been applied to traditional forms of off-campus speech such as student
newspapers, a format necessarily limited by its medium, it does not
seem an unwarranted stretch to apply Tinker to student cyberspeech,
for such speech is instantaneous and nearly limitless in scope. t 44 Stu-
138. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 825-27 (7th Cir. 1998).
139. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 988-89.
140. See Calvert, supra note 10, at 212-13; see also Tomain, supra note 14, at 100; supra Part
III.A.
141. See Calvert, supra note 10, at 210-12 ("Morse ... did nothing to. resolve a much more
pervasive and pernicious First Amendment problem cropping up at schools across the country
that the High Court has never considered. That issue is whether, consistent with the constitu-
tional guarantee of free expression, public school officials may permissibly punish students for
speech that defames, disparages or threatens teachers, administrators and students when that
speech is created [off campus], during non-school hours and posted on the [I]nternet.").
142. See supra notes 111-39 and accompanying text.
143. Compare Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (student not punished for newspaper distributed off
campus), with Boucher, 134 F.3d at 822-23 (student punished for newspaper distributed on
campus).
144. Compare Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 ("[A]ppellants diligently labored to ensure that [their
newspaper] was printed outside the school, and that no copies were sold on school grounds."),
with Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Kowalski indeed
pushed her computer's keys in her home, but she knew that the electronic response would be, as
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dent cyberspeech, by its nature, blurs the line between what occurs at
home and what occurs at school, and lower courts have recognized
this by applying Tinker from the earliest student-cyberspeech case
through the most recent. 145 Indeed, many courts have explicitly rec-
ognized that the weight of authority gives little consideration to the
geographic origin of student speech. 146
Nevertheless, some circuits have formally adhered to a geographic
jurisdictional inquiry. In other words, these circuits base the propriety
of a school's jurisdiction over student speech, at least in part, on
whether or not the speech was created on the school's campus. The
Second Circuit has maintained in student-cyberspeech cases that the
speech can only be regulated when it is "foreseeable that the off-cam-
pus expression might also reach campus. ' 147 The Fourth Circuit re-
cently alluded to a threshold geographic inquiry as well, noting that
"[t]here is surely a limit to the scope of a high school's interest...
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate.' 1 48
Still, both of these courts found that the school in question had
properly asserted jurisdiction over the online, off-campus student
speech 149 and proceeded to apply the Tinker standard. 150 The appar-
ent willingness of these courts to apply Tinker to student cyberspeech
demonstrates that their geographical inquiries are, at best, tenuous.
The Second Circuit has formulated such an expansive test that it is
"easy... for schools to gain jurisdictional authority over off-campus-
it in fact was, published beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach the school
or impact the school environment.").
145. See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
("Disliking or being upset by the content of a student's [website] is not an acceptable justifica-
tion for limiting student speech under Tinker."); T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F.
Supp. 2d 767, 782 (N.D. Ind. 2011) ("[T]he First Amendment standard to be applied [is] whether
... [the principal] reasonably found that the pictures posted on the [ljnternet had disrupted, or
would materially and substantially disrupt, the work and discipline of the school.").
146. E.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("The
overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in
accordance with Tinker."); J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104
(C.D. Cal. 2010) ("In sum, the substantial weight of authority indicates that geographic bounda-
ries generally carry little weight in the student-speech analysis.").
147. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) ("We have determined, however, that
a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds,
when this conduct would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school
environment, at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also
reach campus." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Wisniewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d at 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007).
148. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
149. See id. at 574; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
150. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572-73; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51-52.
[Vol. 62:125
TINKER OPERA TIONALIZED
created Internet expression.' 151 The Fourth Circuit's test is similarly
ineffectual (at least as it currently stands) as a limit on school jurisdic-
tion because it left the scope of the limitation entirely undefined.
152
Therefore, even in circuits that purport to give weight to the geo-
graphic origin of student speech, this inquiry is hardly a bar to schools'
jurisdiction over off-campus speech.
Consequently, some lower courts have regularly blended the thresh-
old geographic question regarding when schools can assert jurisdiction
into the substantive rule of Tinker for determining the appropriate
bounds of the censorship itself. Other courts seem to simply ignore
the geographic question altogether: one district court has stated in re-
gard to student cyberspeech that "[w]here the foreseeable risk of a
substantial disruption is established, discipline for such speech is per-
missible."'1 53 This treatment of the geographic inquiry thus makes the
application of Tinker dispositive-the main focus of the courts is the
effect of the speech rather than the origin of the speech.
Operationalizing Tinker in this way offers two major advantages to
courts facing student-cyberspeech issues. First, the approach simpli-
fies the courts' inquiry. Particularly, by focusing on the effect of the
speech on the school, this approach conserves judicial time by elimi-
nating the necessity for a separate geographical inquiry, an inquiry
that is generally so expansive as to be inadequate as a constraint on
schools' censorship. 154 Second, the operationalized Tinker standard
offers courts the flexibility to parse the facts unimpeded by competing
considerations. Such flexibility is beneficial because the issue of stu-
dent cyberspeech is extremely fact intensive.1 55 Though such a high
degree of flexibility leaves open the possibility of disparate rulings or
excessive deference to school decisions, the lower courts as a whole
have applied the operationalized Tinker standard reasonably and con-
sistently, even without necessarily realizing this to be the case. 15 6 In
151. Calvert, supra note 10, at 235. Calvert noted "three reasons why it is reasonably foresee-
able that nearly any and all controversial or provocative speech that is created and posted [on-
line,] off-campus by a student will come to the attention of school authorities:" (1) tattletale
students; (2) curious teachers/administrators: and (3) in-school buzz/discussion. Id. at 235-36.
152. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 ("There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school's
interest ... when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not
fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of [the student's] speech to [the
school's] pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school offi-
cials ....").
153. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
154. See generally supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part III.C.2.
156. See infra Part III.C.2.
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so doing, the courts have outlined many of the limits and boundaries
of student cyberspeech. 157
2. A Standard Based on the Operationalized Tinker Test
As argued above, the Supreme Court's primary concern in student-
speech cases is the effect of such speech on the work of schools. 158
Recognizing this concern, the majority of courts have operationalized
Tinker by blending the questions of jurisdiction and censorship under
the "substantial disruption" test;159 even those courts that have tried
to keep the questions separate have implicitly operationalized
Tinker.160 In light of this analysis, the next logical step is the investi-
gation of the operationalized Tinker test's boundaries. In other
words, the analysis must determine how this test has been applied
among the lower courts and consider the coherence of the standard it
creates.
While the foregoing study of student-speech jurisprudence illus-
trates that the inquiry is extremely fact intensive, certain general facts
emerge as particularly important. This Subpart of the analysis identi-
fies these facts in the context of the decisions in which they arose and
measures them against the overarching student-speech standard of the
Supreme Court described above, that is, a student may express his
opinions so long as doing so does not materially and substantially in-
trude upon the work of the school.1 61 In this way, this Subpart seeks
to synthesize all of the foregoing discussion and reach a conclusion as
to the efficacy of the student-cyberspeech standard that is developing
in the lower courts. 162
a. Foreseeable Disruption or Undifferentiated Fear?
Fundamentally, the Tinker standard is based on substantial disrup-
tion, so in evaluating student speech under this standard, courts must
be certain that the action of school authorities is based on something
more than undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.163 If
the action has an insufficient basis, then it violates students' First
157. See infra Part III.C.2.
158. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
162. It should be noted here that this Comment does not address the growing concern of
cyberbullying. For a thorough analysis of this important issue, see Chris Burrichter, Comment,
Cyberbullying 2.0. A "Schoolhouse Problem" Grows Up, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 141 (2010).
163. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); see also supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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Amendment rights.164 In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,
for example, a student created a website from home criticizing the
school administration. 165 When a classmate found out about the web-
site, she showed a teacher who in turn showed the principal.166 The
principal testified that he was upset when he made the decision to
discipline the student "immediately upon viewing the homepage," and
that his decision was made "before he knew whether any other stu-
dents had seen or even had knowledge of the homepage.' t67 As such,
the principal's imposition of a ten-day suspension violated the stu-
dent's First Amendment right because the punishment was based on
an emotional reaction to the speech, rather than any foreseeable risk
of disruption1 68
Similarly, in Evans v. Bayer, a student created a social networking
group and posted the following: "Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst
teacher I've ever met! To those select students who have had the dis-
pleasure of having Ms. Sarah Phelps, or simply knowing her and her
insane antics: Here is the place to express your feelings of hatred." 169
The posting was only up for two days and came to the attention of the
principal only after its removal.170 Even so, the principal suspended
the student for three days, 171 based on "serious consequences for the
potentially defamatory content. ' 172 Like in Beussink, the court found
in favor of the student, ruling that the complaint did not contain a
well-founded expectation of disruption.1 73
On the one hand, these cases simply reiterate the substantial disrup-
tion standard: without the reasonable forecast of substantial disrup-
tion, no intrusion on the work of schools can occur. Yet, on the other
hand, they show that the motives behind the punishment handed out
by school officials can play a role in the substantial disruption test.
Decisions to regulate student speech made by administrators in the
164. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("[T]o justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
[school officials] must be able to show that [their] action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.").
165. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
166. Id. at 1177-78.
167. Id. at 1178.
168. See id. at 1180 ("Disliking or being upset by the content of a student's speech is not an
acceptable justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.").
169. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1373.
173. Id. ("[I]f school administrators were able to restrict speech based upon a concern for the
potential of defamation, as Bayer claims, students everywhere would be prohibited from the
slightest criticism of their teachers, whether inside or outside of the classroom.").
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heat of the moment, as in Beussink, or based on an undifferentiated
fear, as in Bayer, are unconstitutional.
b. Students' In-School Discussion of the Speech at Issue is
Insufficient to Create a Substantial Disruption
Beginning with Tinker, the Supreme Court emphasized that stu-
dents merely engaging in controversial speech is insufficient to create
a substantial disruption. 174 The evidence in Tinker showed that sev-
eral non-protesting students made hostile comments and issued warn-
ings to the protesting students.175 Still, the court found that there was
no substantial disruption when students "caused discussion outside of
the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder." 176
The courts have reaffirmed this principle in the Internet era in cases
such as Layshock v. Hermitage School District.177 In that case, a stu-
dent created an online profile of his principal containing vulgar and
offensive language. 178 Even though "word of the profile 'spread like
wildfire' and.. . reached most, if not all, of [the high school's] student
body,' 79 the court found that it did not cause a substantial
disruption. 180
Again, these decisions are clearly consistent with the Supreme
Court precedent because it is highly unlikely that, by itself, discussion
among students would ever intrude upon the work of schools. Indeed,
the Tinker Court stated that communication between students is one
of the principal activities to which schools are dedicated. 181
c. Speech that Causes School Administrators to Be Diverted from
Their Tasks Can Be Sufficient Evidence of Disruption of
School Activities
When teachers or school administrators are forced to leave their
ordinary tasks to mitigate the effects of student speech, the speech has
likely caused a substantial disruption of school activities. One exam-
ple of this kind of speech was discussed in Boucher, illustrated above,
in which a student distributed an underground newspaper containing
174. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
175. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
177. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
178. Id. at 207-08.
179. Id. at 208.
180. Id. at 219.
181. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
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instructions for hacking into the school's computers. 182 As a result of
the newspaper's distribution, the school was required to call technol-
ogy experts to perform hours of diagnostic checks on school com-
puters.18 3 Moreover, the school had to change all of the passwords
mentioned in the article.18 4 The court reasoned that the effort ex-
pended by the school to mitigate the harmful effects of the article
weighed in favor of finding a risk of substantial disruption18 5
Similarly, in Doninger, a student's blog posting, which urged stu-
dents to contact the school about a cancelled school event, resulted in
an inundation of calls and emails related to the event. 186 As such,
some school officials were late to or absent from school-related activi-
ties.187 This led the court to conclude that the student's blog posting
posed a risk of substantial disruption in school operations188
Clearly, one of the most significant aspects of a school's operation is
the education of students. Finding that an activity that diverts school
administrators from their ordinary tasks constitutes a substantial dis-
ruption represents an express recognition by the courts that the effi-
cient administration of education is accomplished in large part
through the cooperation and scheduling of school officials and teach-
ers. Thus, this guideline for addressing student cyberspeech is clearly
in line with the Supreme Court precedent outlined above.18 9 Further,
it is sound policy for courts to disallow student speech that distracts
administrators "from their core educational responsibilities by the
need to dissipate misguided anger"190 or mitigate the technological
harm caused by a student article.' 9 ' Moreover, the lower courts ap-
pear to have focused on the speech's effect on the work of the schools
rather than its effect on the discipline of the schools,1 92 in line with the
operationalized Tinker standard described above.1 93
182. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 822-23 (7th Cir.
1998).
183. Id. at 827.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("This is, at a minimum, some evidence of past disruption, which would support an
inference of potential future disruption-especially in light of the article's promise to 'teach you
more."').
186. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008).
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See generally supra Part III.B.-D.
190. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51.
191. See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1998).
192. See supra notes 158-88 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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D. Illustration of the Standard: Reconciling Doninger and
Blue Mountain
The foregoing analysis considered case law from the top down, be-
ginning with Supreme Court jurisprudence and ending with the spe-
cific decisions of the district courts, in an attempt to articulate the
current judicial landscape of student cyberspeech. It suggested that to
effectively address student cyberspeech, lower courts have had to
operationalize the Tinker test, which has allowed them broad author-
ity over off-campus student speech, particularly cyberspeech. 194 How-
ever, the majority of courts have employed this authority moderately,
and thus have created a practicable standard that is true to the spirit,
if not the letter, of the Supreme Court student-speech
jurisprudence. 195
This final Subpart of the analysis revisits the circuit court decisions
of Doninger v. Niehoffl 96 and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District'97
with the operationalized Tinker standard in mind. As discussed
above, the apparently disparate approaches taken by the Second and
Third Circuits in these cases has caused some unease among commen-
tators. 198 The concern around Doninger, in particular, is even more
marked as many believe that the holding of that case allowed an un-
constitutional infringement upon a student's First Amendment
rights.199 As such, the purpose of this Subpart is twofold: (1) to recon-
cile Doninger and Blue Mountain in light of the operationalized
Tinker standard and (2) to provide a conclusion of the analysis by
detailing the practical application of the operationalized Tinker
standard.
1. The Details of Doninger
Avery Doninger, a student who was an active member of the stu-
dent government at her school, was in charge of organizing an annual
battle of the bands.200 After the event was postponed twice, she and
other students wrote a mass email to the local community urging its
constituents to contact the school and protest the cancellation of the
194. See supra Part III.C.
195. See generally supra Parts II-III.C.
196. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
197. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane).
198. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
200. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44.
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event.20 1 The direct (and desired) result of this email was a deluge of
phone calls and emails to the school, which caused the principal to be
called back from a scheduled in-service day.20 2 The principal then had
a conversation with Doninger and asked her to send out a corrective
email, which she agreed to do.20 3
That night, however, instead of sending a corrective email, Don-
inger wrote a blog from home that reproduced her initial email, ad-
dressed the administration as "douchebags," and further urged fellow
students to contact the school to "piss [them] off more. '' 20 4 The day
after the blog posting, calls continued to pour into the school, adminis-
trators were called from their duties, and a group of upset students
gathered outside of the principal's office.205 When the principal found
out about the blog, she barred Doninger from running for senior class
secretary.206
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Don-
inger's request for a preliminary injunction, holding that she had
failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success on her First
Amendment claim.20 7 After employing the threshold geographical in-
quiry-described and argued against above-to gain jurisdiction,20 8
the court cited three reasons that justified the principal's punishment
of Doninger. First, the blog "was not only plainly offensive but also
potentially disruptive of efforts to solve the ongoing controversy. '20 9
Second, the blog contained "'at best misleading, and at wors[t] false'
information," which made it "foreseeable . . . that school operations
might well be disrupted further by the need to correct misinforma-
tion."'210 Finally, the discipline at issue "related to Avery's extracurric-
ular role as a student government leader. '211
201. See id. Whether the event had in fact been cancelled was a disputed fact, but the district
court credited the principal's testimony denying that she ever told Avery the event would not be
held. Id. at 44-45.
202. Id. at 44.
203. Id. at 45.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 45-46.
206. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46.
207. Id. at 53.
208. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
209. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50-51.
210. Id. at 51 (alteration in original).
211. Id. at 52.
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2. The Details of Blue Mountain
J.S. was an honor roll student who created a fake profile of her
principal on MySpace. 212 The profile contained the principal's picture
from the school district's website, but "did not identify [him] by name,
school, or location. ' 213 "The profile further contained crude content
and vulgar language," and leveled personal attacks at the principal.214
Upon seeing the website, the principal suspended J.S. for ten days.215
The Third Circuit found that the school violated J.S.'s First Amend-
ment rights when it punished her for creating the profile.216 The court
reasoned that Tinker set the general rule for regulating school speech,
and that a forecast of substantial disruption was unreasonable in this
case.217 The court further reasoned that Fraser's lewdness standard
did not apply because the speech originated off campus, and the Fra-
ser standard is explicitly limited to on-campus speech.218
3. Using the Operationalized Tinker Test to Distinguish Doninger
from Blue Mountain
Again, the operationalized Tinker test holds that a student may ex-
press his opinions so long as doing so does not materially and substan-
tially intrude upon the work of the school.219 This includes both
actual intrusion and the reasonable forecast of such an intrusion,220
and courts have distilled certain particularly relevant facts that are in-
structive in the application of this test.221
Examining the facts and reasoning of Doninger and Blue Mountain
in conjunction with this analysis, the two cases are plainly distinguish-
able and properly decided under the operationalized Tinker standard.
It must first be noted that neither of these cases falls under any of the
established exceptions to Tinker.222 This leads to application of the
operationalized Tinker standard, under which a court must determine
212. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 920. For example, the "About me" section of the profile stated, "HELLO CHIL-
DREN[.] yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this
world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.]" Id. at 921 (alteration in original).
215. Id. at 922.
216. Id. at 933.
217. See id. at 930-31.
218. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 932.
219. Supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
220. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
221. See supra Part III.C.2.
222. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. Also, while the district court in Blue
Mountain applied the Supreme Court's Fraser standard, the Third Circuit expressly overruled
that application. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 933.
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at the outset whether the student's punishment was based merely on
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, or whether
there was something more.223 Then, if the punishment resulted from
something more than apprehension, the inquiry is narrowed to two
questions: (1) whether students discussed the contentious speech in
school and (2) whether school administrators were diverted from their
school-related responsibilities. This Comment previously concluded
that mere discussion among students of the speech at issue at the
school does not normally rise to the level of substantial disruption.22 4
Therefore, the dispositive question regarding substantial disruption in
these cases is whether school administrators were pulled from their
tasks, which leads to the same conclusions drawn by the courts.
To fully illustrate, in Blue Mountain, there is some evidence that the
emotions of the principal, about whom the profile was created, were
running high.2 25 However, unlike in Beussink,22 6 the principal in Blue
Mountain attempted to make a legitimate claim that the student's ac-
tion constituted a substantial disruption.227 The punishment enforced
by the principal in Doninger was clearly based on more than undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, as the evidence in that
case showed that the school administrators were inundated with
emails and phone calls about the student blog and purportedly can-
celled event.2 28 Furthermore, neither of these cases presented facts
showing speech that is threatening or violent toward members of the
schools, which could also lead to a fear of disruption.229
Accordingly, the other operative facts of the student-cyberspeech
inquiry must provide guidance for analyzing these cases. In Blue
Mountain, the court did not find that the principal was diverted from
his tasks; in fact, the court found that "any suggestion that, absent [the
principal's] actions, a substantial disruption would have occurred, is
223. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see also supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
225. See Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 922. "[The principal] told J.S.... that he was upset and
angry," threatened her and her family with legal action, and contacted the local police to ask
about the possibility of pressing criminal charges. Id.
226. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
227. See Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 929.
228. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
229. Cf LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). The wide variety in lower
courts' reactions to violent or threatening speech suggests that such speech may present the most
difficulty for courts attempting to distinguish between "undifferentiated" and well-founded fear
of disruption; O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110409 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
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directly undermined by the record. ' 230 Consequently, there were only
"general rumblings" and a few discussions in class about the student
cyberspeech-schoolwork was not substantially disrupted.2 31 Thus,
the court correctly decided that the school infringed upon the stu-
dent's First Amendment rights.
This brings us to Doninger. In Doninger, a student sent a mass
email to her community that caused enough commotion to interrupt
her principal's participation in an in-service day. 232 Although the
principal believed that the email was disingenuous, she did not punish
the student; instead, the principal requested that the student send a
clarifying email.233 Yet the student simply reproduced her earlier, dis-
ruptive (and arguably false) email in a blog posting and offered fur-
ther incitement. 234 Based on the past disruptive actions of the student
and the reaction to the blog, this case presented "facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disrup-
tion of or material interference with school activities. '235 Thus, the
court correctly decided that the school was justified in punishing the
student for her blog posting.
It is also noteworthy that the nature of the punishment handed
down by the schools seemed to influence the courts in these cases.
The student in Doninger was prevented from running for senior class
secretary, and the court noted that "participation in ... extracurricular
activities is a 'privilege' that can be rescinded when students fail to
comply with the obligations inherent in the activities themselves. ' 236
On the other hand, the student in Blue Mountain was punished with a
ten-day suspension, and "[the principal] testified that the other times
he imposed a ten-day suspension were when students brought to
school a knife, razor, alcohol, or marijuana. '237 Therefore, courts
230. See Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 931. "If anything, [the principal's] response to the profile
exacerbated rather than contained the disruption in the school." Id.
231. Id. at 929.
232. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44.
233. Id. at 45.
234. See id. at 45. Doninger's blog referred to the "douchebags in central office" and urged
more callers in order to "piss [the principal] off more." Id.
235. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
236. Id. at 52; accord Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). In Lowry, high school
football players were removed from the team after signing a petition expressing their hatred of
the coach and their desire not to play for him. Id. at 585-86. This was not a violation of the
students' First Amendment rights. See id. at 600. Students were "free to continue their campaign
to have [the coach] fired" but were not free to "continue to play football for him while actively
working to undermine his authority." Id.
237. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 922 & n.17 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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likely consider the proportionality of schools' reaction to student
speech with relation to the harm caused by the speech.
Under the operationalized Tinker standard, the decisions in Don-
inger and Blue Mountain are consistent with one another.238 While in
Doninger there was, at the very least, a reasonably foreseeable risk
that the student cyberspeech at issue would substantially interfere
with the work of the school, the only substantial disruption to the
school's work in Blue Mountain was a result of the principal's reaction
to the student cyberspeech rather than the expression itself.239 Don-
inger's First Amendment rights were not violated, but instead were
adjudicated in accordance with the special characteristics of the school
environment. 240
IV. IMPACT
A. The Operationalized Tinker Standard Is Consistent with the
Policy Behind Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Under the operationalized Tinker standard expounded above,
schools clearly have broad authority. This is so because the operative
factor under this standard is "the work of schools" and, with only min-
imal guidance from public and educational policy, schools essentially
have deference to define this phrase. 241 A school could thus, presum-
ably, grant itself the authority to discipline student speech, even if it
does occur off campus, by broadening its definition of "the work of
schools." This leads to concern that schools have used, and will con-
tinue to use, this wide deference to unconstitutionally infringe upon
the First Amendment rights of students.242
However, the overwhelming evidence gleaned from the decisions of
lower courts employing the operationalized Tinker standard tends to
show that student speech is permitted under this standard far more
often than it is enjoined. 243 Given the strong constitutional protection
that freedom of speech receives,244 this standard is generally in line
with the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. More spe-
cifically, the operationalized Tinker standard aligns with the policy be-
hind the original Tinker decision by continuing to permit students
238. See supra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (describing pub-
lic schools' power over public school children as both "custodial and tutelary").
242. See, e.g., Fronk, supra note 11, at 1441-42.
243. See Wolking, supra note 50, at 1527.
244. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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their "constitutional rights to freedom of speech [and] expression"
within "the schoolhouse gate. '245
In addition to being supported by the jurisprudence of the lower
courts, it is also important to remember that the Supreme Court has
limited the Tinker "substantial disruption" standard in the past. Prior
to being decided by the Suprerfie Court, the lower courts in Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse each employed the "substantial disruption"
standard as outlined in Tinker.246 Yet, in each of these cases the Su-
preme Court intervened and overturned the lower courts' decisions by
creating exceptions to Tinker's substantial disruption test.2 47 The
Court's most recent student-speech decision, Morse, was decided well
after student-cyberspeech cases began making their way into court-
rooms; still, the Court scarcely addressed student cyberspeech in that
opinion. 248 The Court's silence regarding student cyberspeech is sig-
nificant because the Supreme Court has clearly demonstrated a will-
ingness to go beyond the reasoning of Tinker in student-speech
cases. 249 Therefore, the Supreme Court's silence on the issue is just as
telling as a direct decision would be-the Court has not intervened in
the cyberspeech decisions of the lower courts because those decisions
are in line with the original policy behind Tinker.250
B. The Utility of the Proposed Standard for School Administrators
and Students
The operationalized Tinker standard discussed in this Comment will
prove useful to school administrators, students, and parents who are
concerned with student freedom of speech on the Internet by provid-
ing a practicable standard by which to judge such student cyberspeech.
245. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
246. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117-23 (9th Cir. 2006); Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371-76 (8th Cir. 1986); Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d
1356, 1359-61 (9th Cir. 1985).
247. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,408 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
248. The only language from the case that seems, even arguably, to recognize the difficulties
surrounding student cyberspeech is dicta, as Justice Roberts's stated, "There is some uncertainty
at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents, but not on
these facts." Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Supreme Court cited to
Justice Black's dissent from Tinker in both Kuhlmeier and Fraser. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271
n.4; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686. Justice Black's dissenting opinion stated: "I wish, therefore,... to
disclaim any purpose ... to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and
elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The first aspect of this standard that administrators and students
should note is that the geographic origin of the speech does not neces-
sarily curtail schools' authority to limit speech. As traditionally un-
derstood, the Supreme Court's student-speech jurisprudence applies
only to students in school.251 However, the advent of the digital age
has required the extension of the Supreme Court doctrine, and an in-
creasing number of lower court decisions have embodied this
change.2 52
Still, a school can punish student cyberspeech if and only if the ex-
pression in question materially or substantially disrupts the work of
the school. While the implications of such a standard appear broad at
the outset, the growing body of case law dealing with student cyber-
speech has outlined and defined the phrase "materially or substan-
tially disrupts the work of the school. ' 253 Threats of violence, real or
pretend, have been and continue to be a sensitive subject, especially in
the school context. As such, parents and students should not be sur-
prised if violent speech directed toward the school or any member of
the school-student, teacher, or administrator-is subject to school
disciplinary action. However, schools should probably not punish
cyberspeech that is simply vulgar or insulting to school administrators
or officials, even though such speech is perhaps inappropriate, unless
it obstructs the administrators and teachers from carrying on their
jobs.
By way of a final illustration of the operationalized Tinker standard,
consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the facts are similar
to those in Doninger with one slight change: instead of the student
misrepresenting that the school cancelled an event when, in fact, it
had rescheduled the event, the school actually had cancelled the
event. Assume that the student in this hypothetical took the same
steps to encourage community participation, and achieved the same
results as Doninger. This hypothetical could probably be distin-
guished from Doninger based on the emphasis of the operationalized
Tinker standard on "the work of schools." The school in Doninger
was forced to field calls and complaints in order to explain a student's
misrepresentation, and it is highly unlikely that correcting a student's
lie could or should be considered part of the work of schools. The
school in this hypothetical, on the other hand, is forced to field calls to
explain its reasoning for canceling an event that it had previously
sanctioned. At the very least, it is arguable that part of a school's
251. See generally supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part III.C.1.
253. See supra Part III.C.2.
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work is remaining accountable to its constituents. Although these
facts would present a difficult case, it is likely that, under the opera-
tionalized Tinker standard, the student's cyberspeech would be pro-
tected and school punishment would be unwarranted. The student in
this hypothetical simply exercised her First Amendment right to free
speech by petitioning her community with a legitimate concern.
The operationalized Tinker standard is reasonable such that, with
the application of some common sense, students and school officials
should be able to appropriately predict and address the issue of stu-
dent cyberspeech. It has never been the job of the Supreme Court to
babysit unruly schoolchildren, and the standard outlined in this Com-
ment should, as it develops, guard against such a misuse of the Court's
time and resources.
V. CONCLUSION
As the lower courts have addressed cyberspeech controversies be-
tween students and school administrators, these courts continue to re-
main in line with both Supreme Court precedent and one another.254
For the most part, this consistency has been accomplished by using the
Supreme Court standard established in the seminal student-speech
case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,255
to extend school jurisdiction to student cyberspeech regardless of the
geographic origin.256 Thus, the lower courts have, on the whole, oper-
ationalized Tinker by fusing the threshold question of when schools
can assert jurisdiction with Tinker's "substantial disruption" test 257 to
determine whether a school can censor student speech. 258 Without
further guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have been
forced to either apply the existing precedent as accurately as possible,
or establish precedent of their own in contravention of the existing
jurisprudence. Courts have rightfully followed the former route in
student-cyberspeech cases, and as the sample size of such cases contin-
254. See generally supra Parts II, II.
255. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
256. See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001);
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
257. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("[W]here there is no finding and no showing that engaging in
the forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of ap-
propriate discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained." (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
258. See Calvert, supra note 10, at 243.
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ues to grow, a practicable standard with its foundation in the "sub-
stantial disruption" test has taken form.259
Examined in this context, many of the difficulties surrounding stu-
dent cyberspeech are allayed. First, operationalizing the Tinker deci-
sion has resulted in a simple and flexible approach to the problem
that, though it may vary slightly from the letter of the law, is very
much true to the spirit of the decision in Tinker.260 This simple ap-
proach does not automatically simplify the problem, but it does allow
courts to efficiently address the fact-intensive inquiry in student-
cyberspeech cases without being hampered by the threshold geo-
graphic question. 261 Also, under this light, the apparent inconsisten-
cies between lower court decisions disappear. 262 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, school restriction of student speech appears to be
the exception rather than the rule, as "lower courts .. .more often
than not, rely on Tinker to uphold student rights. 2
63
Perhaps part of the support to involve the Supreme Court in stu-
dent cyberspeech is derived from the "fear" of adults that students are
more technologically advanced.2 64 As demonstrated by its current si-
lence, the Supreme Court does not share these concerns. Rarely, if
ever, does a clear solution to a legal problem exist, and this is espe-
cially so with an issue that is as fact-intensive as student speech; it is
unlikely that a single Supreme Court decision will be able to untangle
these facts in all or even most cases. Before hastening to the conclu-
sion that direct intervention by the Supreme Court is the sole solution
to the difficulties raised by student cyberspeech, those concerned
should take a thorough look at the jurisprudence of lower courts and
grant these decisions the respect they deserve.
Darin M. Williams*
259. See supra Part III.C.2.
260. See supra Part IV.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See supra Part III.D.
263. Wolking, supra note 50, at 1527.
264. See Calvert, supra note 10, at 252.
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